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Abstract
The governments of Hungary and Poland have been accused of sliding toward semi-
authoritarianism. Systematic analyses of the responses of political actors at the EU level to these
instances of alleged democratic backsliding are scarce, however. This article therefore
investigates the responses of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to the issue of the qual-
ity of democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland. On the basis of data on parliamentary
questions and motions for resolutions, we analyse who puts these issues on the European Parlia-
ment’s (EP’s) internal agenda and what positions legislators subsequently take in votes on resolu-
tions. We ﬁnd that both ideological preferences and strategic interests determine MEPs’ responses
to democratic backsliding. Our ﬁndings are important for research on EU responses to democratic
backsliding in EU member states as well as for the literature on party competition in the EP.
Keywords: European Union; European Parliament; roll-call voting; issue competition; democratic
backsliding
Introduction
In recent years we have witnessed the rise of semi-authoritarian politics by Central and
Eastern European (CEE) governments (Bruszt, 2015; Greskovits, 2015; Kornai, 2015;
Krastev, 2016). Since the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance government took ofﬁce in
Hungary in 2010, the government led by Viktor Orbán has undertaken efforts aimed at
eliminating checks on the Hungarian executive by undermining the separation of powers,
the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the media (Kornai, 2015;
Rupnik, 2016). In 2017 the Hungarian parliament passed a bill aimed at closing the
Hungarian-American Central European University (CEU) in Budapest- forcing the
CEU to leave Budapest for its Vienna campus in December 2018 (Stewart, 2017). With
the election of the PiS (Law and Justice) government in October 2015, Poland also
witnessed the implementation of a signiﬁcant number of measures at variance with the
principles of a liberal constitutional democracy (Fomina and Kucharczyk, 2016;
Rupnik, 2016). The PiS government unconstitutionally changed the law on the nomina-
tion procedure for the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and attacked media freedom in
Poland, purging the ranks of public broadcasting by dismissing the boards of all
public radio and television stations and placing the newly installed boards directly under
political control of the Ministry of State Treasury.
A number of scholars have argued that the EU has an important role to play in
defending democratic standards and constitutionalism in the face of democratic
backsliding (Bruszt, 2015; Blauberger and Kelemen, 2017; Kelemen, 2017; Sedelmeier,
2014). Yet the reactions of EU institutions to cases of democratic backsliding are widely
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regarded as lacklustre and ineffective. In this context, Kelemen calls for a new research
agenda that explores why the EU ‘tolerate[s] the slide to autocracy of one or more of
its member states’ (2017, p. 2). Moreover, scholars have noted how different the reactions
of EU actors have been toward different cases of democratic backsliding. Whereas the
response to Hungary’s relapse into semi-authoritarianism has been insipid, EU member
states and institutions have been much more willing to respond to the breaches of
democratic standards in Poland. On 20 December 2017 the European Commission
triggered the Article 7 process against Poland, which it has been reluctant to do against
Hungary. Kelemen, therefore, calls for research that attempts to explain ‘differences in
the EU’s reaction to democratic backsliding in various cases’ (2017, p. 2), such as
Hungary and Poland.
This article directly addresses this call for a new research agenda by examining the
determinants of agenda setting as well as voting behaviour in the European Parliament
(EP) on the question of the quality of democracy and the rule of law in Hungary
and Poland. Previous research has found that extensive social pressure on national
governments by EU actors can be effective in resolving violations of the EU’s standards
of constitutional liberal democracy (Sedelmeier, 2014). Arguably, the EP, which is at the
heart of EU-level political contestation, is one of the most suitable arenas for social
pressure on the democratic backsliding. Two important phases for pressure exist in the
EP. The ﬁrst is one of issue emphasis, as MEPs put the issue of democratic backsliding
on the agenda through parliamentary questions and motions for resolutions. The second
phase is one of position-taking, as MEPs vote for or against the adoption of resolutions
on the issue of democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland. Hence, we are interested
not only in who places the issue on the agenda, but also in what positions other legislators
take with regard to this issue.
Our analysis of issue emphasis and voting behaviour reveals that both ideological
preferences and strategic interests inform MEP responses to democratic backsliding
in Hungary and Poland. Our ﬁndings are important for research on EU responses to
democratic backsliding in member states as well as for the literature on conﬂict lines
and party competition in the EP.
I. EU Responses to Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Poland
Most scholars and commentators agree that the reaction of the EU and its member
states to the slide toward semi-authoritarian practices of some EU member states has been
rather half-hearted. To be sure, the legal instruments available to the EU to effectively
counteract instances of democratic backsliding are limited (Blauberger and Kelemen,
2017; Bugarič and Ginsburg, 2016; Sedelmeier, 2017). The Commission can, and has,
launched infringement proceedings against speciﬁc breaches of EU treaty law by demo-
cratic backsliders. Yet, while such infringement cases have succeeded in pressuring
governments such as Orbán’s to retract a number of controversial measures, they
constitute piecemeal solutions to a much broader problem of democratic quality and the
rule of law (Blauberger and Kelemen, 2017; Kelemen, 2017; see also Scheppele, 2013).
EU member states do, in fact, formally have the power to impose far-reaching sanctions
through the activation of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. In case of a breach of
the fundamental democratic values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European
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Union, Article 7 allows member states to suspend certain membership rights of the
Member State in question including the suspension of voting rights. Yet the activation
of Article 7 is fraught with difﬁculty. Member states have never had taken recourse to Ar-
ticle 7 before, which can be explained by the fact that unanimity is required in the Council
and a demanding majority is needed in the EP. Due to the unanimity requirement in the
Council, moreover, other ‘backsliding’ states can obstruct the activation of Article 7 – as
Hungary said it would block sanctions imposed on Poland (Gotev, 2017).
Due to the lack of unanimity in the Council, the Commission’s recent move to trigger
the Article 7 process is therefore best regarded as a symbolic move. Similarly, the recently
created additional tools to address problems regarding the rule of law in member states,
such as the Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and the Council’s Rule of Law Dia-
logue, are again examples of soft policy, rather than decisive legal action against breaches
of the rule of law.
While the reluctance to react to cases of democratic relapse can be explained to some
extent by the fact that the EU has very limited formal and legal means to intervene, some
argue that a lack of political will as well as strategic party-political considerations among
key political actors in the EU institutions are also important factors (Kelemen, 2017).
In this study we aim to analyse how such party-political considerations play out in the
EP, which both legally and rhetorically has an important part to play in the EU’s reactions
to democratic backsliding.
Kelemen (2017) has argued that strategic party politics has informed the attitude of the
Christian-Democratic party group European People’s Party (EPP) towards Orbán’s Fidesz
government in Hungary. Crucially, the plurality of the EPP in the EP is strengthened by
the 12 seats provided by Fidesz, which is a member of the EPP. The relevance of party
politics is also suggested by the very different reaction of EU institutions to democratic
backsliding in Poland since PiS came to power.
Whereas the European Commission did not launch the Rule of Law Framework
procedure or the Article 7 procedure against Hungary, it did so against Poland. Arguably,
unlike Fidesz, PiS does not enjoy the protection of a large and powerful party group.
Rather, it is afﬁliated to the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) – a very
heterogeneous party group led by the British Conservative Party, which also includes
the radical right Danish People’s Party and the Finns Party.
Besides strategic motivations, another possible explanation for the weak response to
democratic backsliding is ideological: political actors disagree on the need for concern
about the quality of democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland. As Orbán’s
explicit support for the Polish PiS government shows, the EU is far from united on what
the standards for democracy and rule of law should be. Qualitative evidence suggests,
moreover, that Orbán’s politics garners support from radical right politicians such as Free-
dom Party leader Geert Wilders (2017).
II. The Party Politics of MEPs’ Responses to Democratic Backsliding
Our analysis aims to understand how strategic party-political considerations and
ideological heterogeneity amongst MEPs and their parties inform responses to democratic
backsliding in the EP. We study two parliamentary phases. In the ﬁrst phase, we analyse
agenda-setting attempts by studying which MEPs put the issue on the agenda and which
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attempt to keep it off the agenda on the basis of parliamentary questions and motions data.
In the second phase, the issue has appeared on the agenda and MEPs are forced to take
positions on it by voting in EP plenary roll-call votes on motions for resolutions, which
is considered to be primarily a form of position-taking in the EP (Høyland, 2010).
In line with saliency theory, we argue that political parties (through their legislators)
emphasize different issues and try to gain a competitive advantage with their issue
emphasis strategy (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Carmines and Stimson, 1986; Dolezal
et al., 2014; Schattschneider, 1960). As such, saliency theory expects political parties
to tend to remain silent on issues that are less advantageous to them. Crucially, such forms
of issue competition are found not only in the domestic parliamentary arena (Baumgartner
and Jones, 1991; Green-Pedersen, 2010; Vliegenthart et al., 2011; van de Wardt, 2015)
but in the EP arena as well (Meijers and van der Veer, forthcoming; Proksch and Slapin,
2011; Slapin and Proksch, 2010).
Our ﬁrst set of hypotheses deals with the ﬁrst parliamentary phase of putting the issue
on the parliamentary agenda. More speciﬁcally, our ﬁrst hypothesis relates to intra-party
group ideological convictions as an important factor. Previous research has shown that
MEPs and party groups in the EP mainly compete along two ideological axes: a left–right
dimension and a European integration dimension (Hix et al., 2007; see also Otjes and van
der Veer, 2016). The left–right dimension encompasses not only the positions of parties
and legislators on economic issues (that is, state-based versus market-based solutions to
economic management), but also includes cultural components. The European integration
dimension captures the positions of legislators and parties towards the issue of more or
less European integration as well as a national government–opposition divide.
To some legislators and parties, the relapse of democratic standards in Hungary and
Poland signals a profound ideological conﬂict. The implementation of illiberal measures
in Hungary and Poland can be seen as a product of party competition being reduced to
identity politics on the cultural dimension (Krastev, 2016; Rupnik, 2016). This is in line
with the argument that conﬂict along cultural lines is becoming important in European
politics (Kriesi et al., 2012).
Crucially, whether or not the changes Hungary and Poland have implemented are seen
as a form of democratic backsliding (rather than merely a form of the development of
democracy, or even progress) probably follows pre-existing lines of conﬂict in the EP.
As noted, existing studies primarily focus on two dimensions of conﬂict. We complement
this understanding of the structure of political conﬂict in the EP by speciﬁcally studying
the effects of the cultural dimension, operationalized as the GAL–TAN dimension
popularized by Hooghe and Marks (2018) that sets apart traditional, authoritarian and
nationalist (TAN) parties and legislators from those who are green, alternative and liberal
(GAL). MEPs from parties on the TAN pole are more likely to agree substantively
with the illiberal reforms in CEE countries (see Sedelmeier, 2014). Consequently,
our ﬁrst hypothesis is based on the expectation that MEPs from parties with a TAN
ideological proﬁle have an incentive to keep the issue of the quality of democracy and
rule of law in EU member states off the agenda:
H1 (Ideology agenda-setting hypothesis): MEPs from national parties with a TAN ideology
are less likely to raise the issue of democratic backsliding than are MEPs from national
parties with a GAL ideology.
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Our second hypothesis relates to strategic inter-party group considerations. In line with
the argument put forward by Kelemen (2017), we posit that MEPs are unlikely to raise the
salience of the democratic transgressions of member-state governments when the
governing parties in question belong to the same European party group. Raising attention
to such cases of democratic relapse is likely to backﬁre, given that MEPs and their
respective national parties are likely to be criticized for condoning such ‘bad democrats’
in their midst. Moreover, party groups are also incentivized to protect member-state
governments if they provide seats in the EP that are necessary to their party group as
well as votes in the EP and the council (Kelemen, 2017, p. 3). Therefore, we expect MEPs
from party groups harbouring these parties to emphasize the issue less than other
mainstream parties:
H2 (Party group agenda-setting hypothesis): MEPs from European party groups afﬁliated
with the party in government in the country in question are less likely to raise the issue of
democratic backsliding than MEPs from (other) mainstream party groups.
Our second set of hypotheses deals with the second parliamentary phase by analysing
position-taking through roll-call votes on motions for resolutions about democratic
backsliding in Hungary and Poland. Whereas legislators are free to try to put an item
on the agenda, they are limited in the options they have in voting on a motion. When
facing the vote, legislators have to choose, ﬁrst of all, whether to vote and when they
do so, whether they are in favour of or against the motion or whether they vote to abstain.1
For this reason, Carrubba et al. (2006) and Høyland (2010) consider voting on resolutions
in roll-call votes to be an ideal venue for position-taking.
The third hypothesis is similar to the ﬁrst, and expects legislators to vote against
motions that condemn democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland if their national
parties occupy a TAN position. This is because we expect these parties to disagree
substantially with the classiﬁcation of backsliding – instead, they are likely to agree
with the reforms taking place in Hungary and Poland. Our third hypothesis therefore
reads:
H3 (Ideology voting hypothesis): MEPs from national parties with a TAN ideology are
more likely to vote against resolutions condemning democratic backsliding than are MEPs
from national parties with a GAL ideology.
Our fourth and ﬁnal hypothesis is related to our second hypothesis in that we expect
legislators from party groups with MEPs from parties in national government
in Hungary or Poland (depending on which country is condemned in the motion) to vote
against these resolutions. As argued before in relation to hypothesis H2 on agenda-setting,
voting in favour of such a motion might backﬁre and lead to accusations of hosting
1Legislators face four options when a roll is being called. They can simply stay away from the plenary and therefore not
participate in the roll call (their vote will be recorded as ‘not present’). When they do participate, they can vote in favour,
against or abstain. Unlike in most other parliaments, legislators thus have two ways of abstaining: by not being present or by
voting ‘I abstain’. Yordanova and Mühlböck (2015) ﬁnd that active abstentions (by voting) constitute an important venue
for party groups to deal with dissent among their legislators and national party delegations.
MEP Responses to Democratic Backsliding 5
© 2019 The Authors JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
non-democratic parties among the group’s midst. As a result, our fourth hypothesis
reads:
H4 (Party group voting hypothesis): MEPs from European party groups afﬁliated with the
party in government in the country in question are less likely to vote in favour of motions
condemning democratic backsliding than MEPs from (other) mainstream party groups.
III. Data and Methods
We test our hypotheses on MEP behaviour over the quality of democracy and the rule of
law in Hungary and Poland on the basis of a dataset capturing issue emphasis in the EP
and a dataset measuring MEP voting behaviour on motions for resolutions. All replication
materials are in the Supporting Information online.2
Measuring Issue Emphasis in the EP
We measure MEPs’ agenda setting on democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland
through their emphasis of the issue in parliamentary questions and motions. As noted,
parliamentary questions and motions are particularly useful for agenda-setting purposes
as these instruments are the least affected by the disproportionate agenda-setting powers
in the EU.
The analysis relies on an original dataset constructed by the scraping and normalization of
disaggregated data from the EP’s online parliamentary archives. Subsequently, we linked the
data to stable identiﬁers for legislators, parties and various other types of institutions, includ-
ing identifying links to other common datasets such as ParlGov (Döring and Manow, 2016)
and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). Whether a parlia-
mentary question or motion is related to issue of the quality of democracy and the rule of law
in Hungary or Poland is established by means of a semi-automated content analysis using a
basic dictionary of keywords. The keyword dictionary combines two keyword lists: one with
keywords on the quality of democracy and rule of law and one of country keywords on the
government and government ofﬁcials in ofﬁce during the period of study in the country
in question. The lists of keywords can be found in the supporting information online
(Table S1–S3). The rationale behind this strategy is that if anMEP chooses to discuss the de-
cline of democratic standards in a certain country, she will use terms concerned with central
democratic values or principles allegedly under threat in combination with a reference to the
government or government ofﬁcials of the country in question.3
Because the democratic deterioration has taken place in different periods for the two
cases under examination, we examine the parliamentary questions and motions for
different time frames. For the Hungarian case, we collect parliamentary questions and
motions on democratic backsliding for the period from 25 April 2010, the day Orbán’s
2http://www.maurits-meijers.eu/data/
3We extracted a sample of 10 per cent of such cases and manually checked the automated coding procedure. We found that
around 80 per cent of the questions and motions speak of democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland in a condemning
way, while around 13 per cent support backsliding. Moreover, we found that 29 per cent of the retrieved documents were
not directly related to backsliding. We determined, furthermore, that these non-relevant documents were spread out equally
among party groups and cases, which strengthens our conﬁdence in the data quality.
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Fidesz party was elected, until 1 June 2017. The analysis of the Polish case starts on 25
October 2015, the day the PiS party was elected, until 1 June 2017. For both cases the
data is aggregated over time with the individual MEP as unit of analysis.
The dependent variable in the agenda-setting analysis is the total number of parliamen-
tary questions and motions a given MEP puts forward that matches the list of keywords
on democratic backsliding described above. Hence, our estimations deal with discrete,
non-negative values. The data, in addition, are over-dispersed, meaning that the variance
of the count variables exceeds their mean. This is common for event counts where many
observations have a value of zero, but it violates the assumption of statistical indepen-
dence in the observed events and can inﬂate coefﬁcient signiﬁcance. To study the
emphasis on democratic backsliding, we therefore employ negative binomial regression
models, which include a parameter that reﬂects the unobserved heterogeneity in the
observations (Long and Freese, 2001, p. 243).4
Measuring Voting Behaviour in the EP
Voting behaviour in the EP is usually studied on the basis of roll-call vote data.5 Broadly
speaking, MEPs can vote on two types of motions; legislative proposals and motions for
resolutions (Carrubba et al., 2006). While motions under the ordinary legislative and
consent procedure can have a substantial impact on legislative outcomes, resolutions
are not legislatively consequential. Voting for resolutions is therefore largely a matter
of position-taking (Carrubba et al., 2006, p. 695; Høyland, 2010). An analysis of voting
behaviour in motions for resolutions on the quality of democracy and rule of law in
Hungary and Poland is therefore well suited to study MEP preferences on democratic
backsliding.
For the voting behaviour analysis, we use data from four roll-call votes on the quality
of democracy and the rule of law: one roll-call vote on the situation in Hungary in 2017
and three votes on Poland in 2016. The vote on Hungary (B8–0295/2017) and two votes
on Poland (B8–0461/2016; B8–0977/2016) were on resolutions condemning democratic
backsliding. The other resolution on Poland, tabled by the radical right Europe of Nations
and Freedom (ENF) party group, was in defence of the Polish government against EU
interference (B8–0865/2016). It is worth noting that for all four votes it was the
radical right party group ENF that requested the roll call. This is in line with Thierse’s
(2016, p. 236) argument that roll-call vote requests ‘offer a minority the opportunity to
stake out a position and to coerce a majority into taking a publicly recorded stance’ on
a certain issue.6
4Likelihood ratio tests also indicate that negative binomial regression models are preferable to Poisson count models. The
Vuong test, moreover, indicates that zero-inﬂated negative binomial regression model is not preferable to regular negative
binomial regression models (Hilbe, 2014, p. 197).
5The use of roll-call voting data has been criticized in the literature on account of potential selection bias. Roll-call votes
constitute approximately one-third of all votes cast in the EP (Carrubba et al., 2006; Høyland, 2010; Thierse, 2016;
Yordanova and Mühlböck, 2015). Any party group or at least 40 MEPs can ask to call the roll. For other voting methods,
such as voting by show-of-hands or electronic votes, only the end result of the votes is recorded and this is therefore not
suitable for analyses of individual voting decisions. For our purposes, selection bias is not a problem because we are inter-
ested in a speciﬁc set of motions of resolutions related to democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland, as opposed to an
entire set of representative votes.
6For one resolution vote on Poland, the ECR, party group of the Polish government party PiS, also requested a roll-call vote
– possibly to signal within-party group disagreement.
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In line with recent research, we analyse roll-call votes using logistic regression
analysis, in which individual vote decisions by legislators are used as the dependent
variables and quantities of interests as the independent variables, such as party (group)
afﬁliation and ideological positions (Otjes and van der Veer, 2016; Roger et al., 2017).
Using this method, we select a small number of votes on which we regress the voting
decisions of individual legislators as a function of ideological and party group afﬁliation.
We employ a logistic regression model in which the dependent variable measures the yea
votes as opposed to the no votes. Abstentions are not taken into account in the logistic
regression analysis. As such, we are able to ascertain what factors contributed to
condemning Hungary and Poland. As one of the motions was put forward by a radical
right legislator, defending rather than condemning democratic backsliding, we ‘ﬂip’ the
vote so that we predict the act of voting nay rather than yea.
Independent Variables
To test our hypotheses, we construct the independent variables for analysing the issue
emphasis and the voting behaviour in similar ways.
To test the national party ideology hypotheses (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3), we
employ the GAL–TAN variable in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey data to determine the
extent to which a party adheres to traditional, authoritarian and nationalist positions or
instead promotes democratic liberal values (see also Sedelmeier, 2014). The variable is
rescaled from 0 to 10 – with 10 marking the most extreme stance on the TAN pole.
Because the agenda-setting data are aggregated over a longer time period in the case of
Hungary, we take the mean of an MEP’s national party left–right and GAL–TAN scores
throughout the whole period (2010–17).
In order to measure the party group hypotheses (Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4), we
introduce dummy variables signifying the membership of the national party of the party
group in question. When MEPs have switched party groups we use the party group afﬁl-
iation the MEP held for the plurality of the time. In the hypotheses, we gauge whether
MEPs who shared a party afﬁliation with the Hungarian or Polish governing parties
(the EPP and the ECR, respectively) differ from other mainstream parties. The Christian
democratic EPP, the social democratic S&D (Socialists and Democrats) and the liberal
ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) are considered to be mainstream
actors, as their constituent national parties are regularly in government (Hix et al., 2007,
p. 116). Table S4 in the supporting information shows that the absolute number as well as
proportion of national parties in government within the EPP, S&D and ALDE is much
higher. Although the ECR, the party group of the UK Conservatives and the Polish
PiS, cannot be considered a mainstream party group, we compare them in Polish case
against the EPP, S&D and ALDE.
The models also controll for the position of the MEPs’ national party on the economic
left–right axis using Chapel Hill Expert Survey data. The variable is operationalized in the
same way as the GAL–TAN variables and is also rescaled from 0 to 10. We also controll
with a dummy variable for whether the country is a CEE country or not. Moreover,
Proksch and Slapin (2011) and Jensen et al. (2013) have argued that national opposition
parties tend to use agenda-setting instruments to make EU institutions, primarily the
Commission, aware of problems of implementation of EU regulations and laws. To
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ascertain whether our ﬁndings are not driven by the government–opposition status of the
MEP’s national party, we controll for this. Given that we examine an extended period
with aggregated data in the agenda-setting analyses, a dummy variable whether a party
was in government or not is not feasible – as many EU member states have seen govern-
ment changes in that period. Therefore, we calculate the proportion of the number of days
an individual MEP’s national had been in government relative to the days when the MEP
was in the EP. For the roll-call voting analysis, a regular government-opposition dummy
is used.
Robustness Checks
In addition to these main models, we also conduct a number of robustness checks. First, in
line with the analysis by Jensen et al. (2013), we recognize that opposition parties might
use agenda-setting methods in the EP to call upon EU institutions to undertake action against
wrongdoing from their own governments. In a separate model in the online appendix, we test
the models while controlling for whether the Hungarian or Polish MEP belongs to a respec-
tive national opposition party with a dummy variable. In addition, we control for the possi-
bility that the EU position of an MEP’s national party affected our main results. The EU
position variables are measured using Chapel Hill Expert Survey data and operationalized
in the same way as the GAL–TAN and left–right variable.
In addition we test a number of different models for both the issue emphasis
analysis and roll-call vote analysis. For both analyses, we test the models with MEP coun-
try ﬁxed effects. For the issue emphasis model, we also report Poisson estimates as well as
logistic regression models. For the roll-call vote analysis, we verify whether abstention
votes affect our main results by estimating different models by including abstentions.
In addition, we examine whether the results of the Polish roll-call votes analyses are af-
fected by the different votes with a dummy variable. Tables with the descriptive
statistics for each dataset are provided in the supporting information (Table S6–8).
VI. Findings
Table 1 shows the results of the negative binomial regression analysis of the agenda-
setting analysis (model A1 and A2) and the results for the logistic regression analysis
of the resolution votes (model B1 and B2). Rather than the estimated logarithm of the
expected event count, we report exponentiated coefﬁcients (incidence rate ratios) in this
table. That is, they show how a one-unit increase in the independent variable affects
the rate by which MEPs emphasize democratic backsliding, on the one hand, and the
propensity of MEPs to vote in favour of a condemning resolution, on the other. Values
below 1 signal a negative relationship, values above 1 a positive relationship. The original
models showing the estimated expected change in the log odds can be found in the
supporting information (Table S9).
The ideology agenda-setting hypothesis (H1) expects that parties with a TAN ideology
were less likely to emphasize the issue of quality of democracy and the rule of law.
Model A1 shows for the Hungarian case that a one-point increase in the GAL–TAN var-
iable (ranging from 0 to 10) induces a statistically signiﬁcant 23 per cent drop in the
expected number of questions and motions on democratic backsliding. For Poland
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(model A2), the GAL–TAN variable also shows a negative effect – albeit with a smaller
substantive effect as a higher value on the GAL–TAN variable induces an 8 per cent drop
in the expected issue emphasis. To facilitate a substantive interpretation of these results
we also visualize the marginal effect of the GAL–TAN variable on the emphasis demo-
cratic backsliding in Figure 1. Figure 1 clearly shows that, while for both Hungary and
Poland there is a negative effect of GAL–TAN position, the effect is substantively smaller
in the Polish case. Nevertheless, these ﬁndings allow us to accept H1 in both cases.
Looking at the control variables in both models A1 and A2, we see that MEPs from
CEE countries were more likely to raise the issue. In the Polish case, MEPs from national
parties that belong to the economic right were less likely to emphasize the issue. In the
Hungarian case, MEPs from national parties that were in government were less likely
to push the issue onto the agenda.
Due to the fact that the dichotomous party group variables are highly collinear with
the ideology variables, it is not possible to compare the relative strength of the ideology
variables vis-à-vis the party group afﬁliation variables. For the agenda-setting analysis,
the leverage of the party group variables has therefore been calculated in different models
without the ideology variables. Figure 2 shows the predicted number of parliamentary
questions and motions on democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland per party group.
For the Hungarian case, the ﬁgure shows that, in accordance with the party group agenda-
setting hypothesis (H2), the EPP is very reluctant to ask questions about Hungary and
asks signiﬁcantly fewer questions than ALDE and the S&D. For Poland, we would expect
to see the ECR – of which the PiS party is a member – to ask fewer questions than its
Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist (TAN) and Green, Alterna-
tive and Liberal (GAL–TAN) Position on the Predicted Emphasis on Democratic Backsliding.
The estimates for Hungary are based on model A1 and the estimates for Poland are based on model
A2 (Table 1). The dashes represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Source: authors’ data.
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mainstream competitors. While we see in Figure 2 that the ECR clearly asks fewer
questions than the European Green Party (EGP) and the European United Left–Nordic
Green Left (GUE/NGL), there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference between the
emphasis of the ECR and the emphasis of the EPP and S&D. In both the Hungarian case
and the Polish case, MEPs from the liberal party group ALDE, the radical left GUE/NGL
and the EGP were most likely to emphasize the issue of quality of democracy and the rule
of law.
Turning to the analysis of MEPs’ voting behaviour on the quality of democracy and
rule of law in Hungary and Poland, model B1 shows that the ideology voting
hypothesis (H3), which formulates the expectation that that MEPs from national parties
with a TAN ideology are more likely to vote against condemning resolutions, can be
accepted in both the Hungarian and the Polish case. To visualize this effect, Figure 3
shows the marginal effect of the GAL–TAN position on the probability of voting in
favour of sanctions on Hungary and Poland. The steep slope in both cases indicates
the strong negative effect that the GAL–TAN position has on MEPs’ likelihood to vote
for sanctions.
In addition, the logistic regression models show that parties in opposition were
more likely to vote in a condemning manner on democratic backsliding. Moreover, in
the Hungarian case we found that the more left-wing MEPs’ national parties are, the
more likely they are to condemn democratic backsliding. The variable controlling for
MEPs being from a CEE country is signiﬁcant in the Polish case, but not in the
Hungarian case.
Figure 4 presents the voting records of the four resolutions under examination per
party group. The descriptive data allow us to examine the voting patterns per party
Figure 2: Predicted Emphasis on Democratic Backsliding per Party Group. Estimates from
Hungary and Poland are based on Models 1 and 2 in Table S10. The whiskers represent 95%
conﬁdence intervals.
ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; ECR, European Conservatives and
Reformists; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; EGP, European Green Party; ENF,
Europe of Nations and Freedom; EPP, European People’s Party; GUE/NGL, European United
Left–Nordic Green Left; NA, Non-Attached; S&D, Socialists & Democrats.
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist (TAN) Parties and Green,
Alternative and Liberal (GAL–TAN) Position on the Predicted Probability of Voting for
Sanctions.
The estimates for Hungary are based on model B1 and the estimates for Poland are based on model
B2 (Table 1). The dashes represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Source: votewatch.eu.
Figure 4: Voting Record per Party Group.
ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; ECR, European Conservatives and
Reformists; EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy; EGP, European Green Party; ENF,
Europe of Nations and Freedom; EPP, European People’s Party; GUE/NGL, European United Left
–Nordic Green Left; NA, Non-Attached ; S&D, Socialists & Democrats.
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group. As hypothesized in the party group voting hypothesis (H4), we see that that
most of the MEPs from the EPP voted against the resolution on the situation in
Hungary. Yet, approximately 30 per cent of MEPs from the EPP condemned this
situation in Hungary, indicating important divisions within the party group. Figure 4
shows that, in line with our expectations, in the resolutions on the Polish case more
than 75 per cent of the ECR, the party group of the Polish governing party PiS, did
not condemn the Polish government. Approximately 12 per cent of the ECR did
condemn the Polish government. The voting patterns of the other party groups are
very much in line with our ﬁndings of MEPs’ agenda-setting attempts – as ALDE
and the EGP in particular voted overwhelmingly in favour of resolutions condemning
the Hungarian and Polish governments.
As robustness checks, we have included a large number of alternative model
speciﬁcations. We present and discuss these models in Appendix S1.
Conclusion
This article has provided evidence on the question how MEPs respond to democratic
backsliding in EU member states in terms of two parliamentary phases; namely,
legislators’ attempts at putting the issue on the agenda and the position-taking of
legislators afterwards. While there is a signiﬁcant overlap between the patterns of
MEP behaviour with respect to democratic backsliding in the Hungarian and Polish
case, there are a number of noteworthy differences. Unlike in the Hungarian case,
opposition status and party group membership did not have statistically signiﬁcant
effect on an emphasis of the issue of the quality of democracy and the rule of law
in Poland. Moreover, MEPs from governing parties were less likely to support resolu-
tions condemning democratic backsliding in both Hungary and Poland and they were
less likely to emphasize the issue of democratic quality and the rule of law in the
case of Hungary. With respect to party group membership, we demonstrated that in
the Hungarian case MEPs from the EPP were less likely to emphasize the issue. In
the Polish case, we saw no signiﬁcant difference between ECR MEPs and mainstream
party group MEPs. With respect to the roll-call votes, most MEPs from the EPP and
the ECR both voted against motions condemning the Hungarian and Polish govern-
ments, respectively. As we were not able to calculate the ideological determinants
and party group afﬁliation variables in a single model we were not able to determine
whether party group membership or national party ideology is more decisive in
steering MEP behaviour. Future research could attempt to disentangle party group
membership and national party ideology as determinants for MEP behaviour – for
instance with MEP-level data of ideological preferences.
How can we account for these contrasting ﬁndings? First, MEPs from opposition
parties may feel less need to check the European executive in the Polish case because
the EU, and especially the Commission, have been much more decisive in targeting the
Polish government than the Hungarian one (Kelemen, 2017; Sedelmeier, 2014, 2017).
In addition, the periods in which our two cases have experienced democratic backsliding
differ. The situation in Hungary has been ongoing for almost eight years, whereas
Poland has started steering away from liberal democracy only relatively recently. These
shorter time periods may affect the propensity to which national opposition parties and
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party groups have been able to devise issue emphasis strategies on the matter. With
respect to the insigniﬁcant party group effect in the Polish case it is important to
recognize that the ECR is a rather recent party group marked by signiﬁcant ideological
heterogeneity – including, for instance, both UK Conservatives, the radical right Danish
People’s Party and the left-leaning Christian Union from the Netherlands. The shorter
period of analysis for the Polish case has, of course, also affected the number of
observations, raising the bar for statistically signiﬁcant results. It is, moreover, striking
that the variable controlling for whether a MEP is from a CEE country is signiﬁcant in
the agenda-setting analysis, but not in the roll-call vote analysis in the Hungarian case.
This contrasting ﬁnding suggests that additional research is needed about how political
actors from the CEE region respond to democratic backsliding and what accounts for
the variation between countries and between political response mechanisms.
Sedelmeier (2014, 2017) demonstrated for the 2012 case of Romania that the exertion
of social pressure on member states can be effective in inducing a return to liberal
democracy. Our ﬁndings suggest that only some MEPs and party groups are, in fact,
exerting such social pressure through agenda-setting mechanisms as well as voting
behaviour in resolutions. In particular, the EPP, the EP’s largest party group, is
remarkably silent. While it is possible that the EPP uses other political arenas, such as
the Council, to advance claims on democratic backsliding, we know from the existing
literature that it has been hesitant to do so (Kelemen, 2017).
Besides differences between the cases of Hungary and Poland, we also found a
number of commonalities. We have provided evidence that suggests that both MEPs’
ideological preferences and strategic interests determine their responses to democratic
backsliding in Hungary and Poland. In both cases MEPs from national parties with
traditional, authoritarian and nationalist positions place less emphasize on the issue
of democratic quality and the rule of law and tend to vote against motions condemning
challenges to democracy and the rule of law. This suggests that some do not want to
question the democratic backsliding of liberal democratic values because they
agree substantively with attempts to create semi-autocratic regimes in Western
Europe (see Hooghe and Marks, 2018). These results could indicate that a conﬂict is
emerging among MEPs about what political direction the EU or its member states
should take, at least partly following the GAL–TAN divide. Further research is there-
fore called for to establish whether or not a new line of (cultural) conﬂict permeates
political conﬂict in the EP.
Our ﬁndings also have important implications for the literature on the inﬂuence of
European party groups and federations on national partner parties in CEE countries.
In line with scholarship on Europeanization (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005), this
literature assumed that European party groups were able to ‘Westeuropeanize’ CEE
parties by the exchange of material and immaterial resources as well as through socializa-
tion processes (Delsoldato, 2002; Lewis and Mansfeldová, 2007; von dem Berge and
Poguntke, 2013). Today we see that European party groups have been reluctant to enforce
adherence to liberal democratic norms as they are incentivized to maximize their
number of seats in the EP – the suspension of the Slovak Direction-Social Democracy
(SMER-SD) by the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (PES/S&D) is an
exception to this rule (Haughton, 2014). In the case of Fidesz and the EPP it seems that
the size of Fidesz in the EP and as a a player in the Council has led the EPP to ‘accept
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a difﬁcult, that is, not very compatible, partner among its ranks’ (von dem Berge and
Poguntke, 2013, p. 320).
There have been a number of indications recently, however, that the EPP’s attitude
towards Orbán’s Fidesz government is slowly changing. Prominent EPP politicians
such as EPP parliament leader Manfred Weber and German Chancellor Angela Merkel
have denounced Orbán’s recent attack on academic freedom in Hungary (Central
European University, 2017; Sheftalovich, 2017). As Kelemen (2017) has argued, support
for autocratic sub-polity regimes can be withdrawn when the reputational cost of
supporting them becomes too high. Time will tell whether such public statements against
the Fidesz government signal a profound change in the EU’s policy towards Orbán’s
Hungary or are, instead, strategic attempts to defuse the mounting criticism of the EPP’s
close ties with the Orbán government.
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